When self-consciousness breaks, by G. Lynn Stephens & G. Graham by Proust, Joëlle
Criticial Review of: When self-consciousness breaks, by
G. Lynn Stephens & G. Graham
Joe¨lle Proust
To cite this version:
Joe¨lle Proust. Criticial Review of: When self-consciousness breaks, by G. Lynn Stephens & G.
Graham. Philosophical Psychology, Taylor & Francis (Routledge), 2002, 15 (4), pp.543-550.
<ijn 00139122>
HAL Id: ijn 00139122
http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/ijn 00139122
Submitted on 29 Mar 2007
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
When self-consciousness breaks 
G. Lynn Stephens & G. Graham 
 
Cambridge, Mas. : MIT Press, 2000 
 
 
This fascinating book deals with the experience of externality,  i.e. an experience  
characteristic of verbal hallucination and of thought insertion, in which a subject attributes to 
an external cause an event that in fact occurred in her own mind.  In verbal hallucination, a 
subject hears voices:  it is part of her experience that these are persons speaking to her 
(usually in a critical manner). The oddity of such an experience is that the hallucinated subject 
does not have any visual experience congruent with what she hears. In thought insertion, the 
oddity goes still deeper: here, a subject disavows being the original thinker of one particular 
thought. As philosophers of mind have often remarked, it is difficult to make sense of the 
report on such an experience, for “thinking someone else’s thought”  seems to describe an 
impossible situation. The  patient insists however that some thinking episode feels being 
externally driven, such that the corresponding thought looks literally implanted in her mind.   
Whereas thought insertion is a symptom of a schizophrenic disorder listed in DSM IV, 
verbal-auditory hallucinations typically affect schizophrenic patients as well as ordinary 
people – a survey reports that 70% of a sample of college students experienced them at least 
once. The analysis of this phenomenon is accordingly not conducted here as part of an attempt 
to understand schizophrenia; it rather aims at unravelling the psychological structure of 
human consciousness. Even though, as the authors finally admit, much remains to be learnt on 
self-consciousness, the book offers two important contributions. One is a valuable discussion 
of the various ways of addressing the paradoxical experience of externality. The other is an 
emphasis on a distinction between the experience of subjectivity and the experience of 
agency. This review  will try to show that this distinction is indeed a crucial feature in any 
solution to the question of externality, but that it is associated with a view of thinking as 
acting that is questionable.   
 
The authors themselves see their book as polyphonic, involving with several voices (see p. 
133), so that we can only recover the argument of the book by following their variations on a 
central theme. What constitutes the  book's value, and main interest,  is that it offers a critical 
survey and a lively discussion of much of the contemporary literature on the subject.  
The authors first present a theory for verbal-auditory-hallucinations  -- developed in 
various versions,by Thomas Szasz, Louis Gould, Marcel Kinsbourne, -- which they call SPM, 
for the self-produced but misattributed conception. This account is based on two claims. A 
patient who hears voices generates the messages expressed by the voices and misattributes 
them to  another person. One way of framing this account hypothesizes that a patient hears 
one of her own subvocalized inner speech sequences as someone else’s utterance. Obstructing 
subvocalization in various ways (like holding one’s mouth  wide open, or humming a note), 
seems in most cases to block verbal hallucinations. Now what does one mean by “hearing 
one’s voice as someone else’s”? The so-called “auditory-hallucination model”  (AHM) is a 
claim common to SPM theories, according to which a crucial factor in misattributing the 
voice’s message is the similarity of the experience of hearing this particular voice  and the 
typical experience of hearing another person speak.  The hallucinator confuses what he just 
imagined with what he might, in other circumstances, have perceived, because of a close 
similarity in the corresponding experiences. At this point, a circle needs to be avoided, 
explaining similarity between experiences by a tendency to mistake one for the other, and 
explaining the tendency to mistake one for the other through the similarity of the 
experiences.Perhaps, as the authors also suggest (p. 47), the similarity in the experiences is 
not of a phenomenal nature; it is rather restricted to their properties of having one definite 
content (the fact that it is verbal-auditory, independently of the particular qualitative feel of 
such a content) and of not being under voluntary control. But this needs to be substantiated, 
and this is where Ralph Hoffman’s 1986 paper in BBS  offers promising suggestions.  
In agreement with an influential research by Maher (1974), Hoffman argues that 
misattribution is not a result of a misguided reasoning or of a disturbed thinking process, but 
rather of altered perceptual data. Hoffman’s specific contribution includes two claims: a) The 
voices are verbal images that, in contrast with ordinary experiences of inner speech, are 
perceived as unintended and  b) unintended speech is automatically taken to be alien. Claim a 
is justified by the view that schizophrenic patients suffer breakdowns in the planning 
processes of their outer and inner speech; (this hypothesis has been well documented in 
various experimental data by Frith, Jeannerod and their respective co-workers1). The 
impression of unintendedness is plausibly a result of this defective prediction of auditory 
feedback. Claim b is obviously much more difficult to establish. According to Hoffman, a 
patient  experiences her inner speech as “strongly unintended”, i.e. not only in the sense that 
                                                
1 See Frith (1992), Frith et al. (2000), Daprati et al. (1997), Jeannerod  . (1999). 
she does not have a conscious access to the corresponding plan  – this is the “weak sense”-, 
but also in the stronger sense that its occurrence  actually conflicts  with her occurrent 
conscious goals and values. In such a case, a patient might be unable to handle the proper 
reality test that, in the weak case, normally allows inhibiting the non-self inference. 
 
The authors are not fully satisfied with Hoffman’s theory, because it leaves some crucial 
points unexplained. In particular, why should unintended inner speech be automatically 
interpreted as externally produced ? Furthermore, is it not difficult to believe that unintended 
inner speech should be related to  a discourse planning failure, as the voices are generally 
well structured and have clear communicative goals ? Why are the voices always addressing 
the patient herself ? And how might Hoffman’s account deal with the numerous cases in 
which voices are experienced as both internal (rather than audition-like) and alien ?  
The authors aim at building an alternative account, where  the verbal-auditory hallucinator 
does not simply mistake inner speech for auditory perception, and  where voices do not need 
to be externally perceived. In this second approach, voices and thought insertion are taken to 
be closely related phenomena that call for a common account. Thus the discussion moves to 
another clinical aspect of the schizophrenic syndrom : how is thought insertion to be 
explained ? 
Philosophers diverge on the issue of whether access to one’s mental happenings 
necessarily implies their attribution to oneself. The problem, sometimes named the “transition 
problem” (Peacocke, 1999), involves understanding the kind of link that allows a thinker to 
derive, from having a certain perception  P or a thought T, the belief that [I perceive P] or [I 
think T]. Locke, Chisholm and Shoemaker defend the view that the transition link is 
necessary, with arguments that range from metaphysical to functional/ epistemological 
claims. Other philosophers hold that the transition is far from necessary. Hume famously 
rejected the very possibility of a natural transition towards a self in whom ideas are supposed 
to occur. In a similar vein, Armstrong (1968) holds that the self referred to in "I thing T"  is a 
theoretical contruct that goes beyond the data given in awareness. Using Armstrong’s view, 
one might hold that a thought can be self- or other-attributed only if two conditions are 
satisfied : 1) a thinker has acquired verbally the notion of a   self (along with a theory of 
mind),  and  2) she has introspective access to occurrent mental happenings. When the latter 
are coherent with her long-standing beliefs, desires and intentions, she is able to infer that 
such thoughts are her own, i.e., are produced in her mind; when they are not so coherent, in 
certain further conditions to be spelled out, the inference might be that “they are not states of 
the same substance” (see Campbell, 1999, for a similar view applied to perturbed identity in 
schizophrenic patients). 
Such an account would miss a crucial fact, according to the authors. For a deluded patient 
may experience a particular thought as alien while also insisting that this thought occurs in 
her own mind. A patient who experiences thought insertion might thus seem to have retained 
a sense of her ego-boundary. One might accommodate Armstrong’s theory however by 
contrasting the conception of her mind  acquired on the basis of inferences from earlier 
normal episodes of thought processes with her present impression of extraneity, linked to the 
incongruence of an occurrent thought or train of thoughts. A patient could thus well retain her 
former sense of a proprietary mind (based on the previous coherence of her thoughts), while 
also insisting that thoughts that present themselves in it now are not her own (for the new 
thoughts fail  to be coherent with her acquired dispositions). In fact, this kind of solution of 
the experience of alienation is close to the one that the authors will eventually offer. We will 
come back to it below. 
  
Let us grant Stephens and Graham, at this point, that explaining the subjectivity of our 
thoughts does not exhaust the question of ownership recognitifion, for we need to explain 
what the additional conditions are in which a subject will attribute a thought to another mind 
rather than simply disown it. Armstrong’s theory needs to be supplemented by an account on 
the kind of monitoring needed for self- or other-attribution of thoughts.  Frith’s account offers 
this additional piece of theorizing : voices and delusions of thought insertion reflect  an 
impairment in action monitoring. A patient hears voices because she does not recognize her 
intended actions as her own. This account of   thought-insertion is based on the view that 
thinking is acting: a patient with this delusion does not have any "sense of effort" associated 
with having a particular thought. This account differs from Hoffman’s by claiming that the 
patient did intend his words or thoughts (for Hoffman, remember, the words and thoughts 
were unintended as a result of a defective discourse planning device.). What Frith’s account 
still does not explain however, as the authors show, is why the failure in intention monitoring 
results in a sense of alienation rather than simply in a feeling of unintendeness. Neither does it 
explain why a subject so perturbed may end up having a delusion of control (where someone 
influences his actions or thoughts) rather than a delusion of thought insertion.   
Harry Frankfurt (1988) is then called as a third voice to complete Hoffman’s and Frith’s 
intuitions with  a conceptually adequate notion of externalization: my arm can go up without 
my wanting it (for example if a neurosurgeon activates the relevant neurons); just the same, 
some thoughts can occur in my mind without my having formed any intention to think them. 
These are thoughts that I find occurring in me, rather than thoughts in whose occurrence “I 
actively participate”. A patient’s delusional experience can be understood on the basis of this 
new distinction.  A patient may well claim that a thought occurred in her mind while also 
insisting that it was not her thought. These two claims refer to the two previously established 
dimensions in self -awareness, the sense of subjectivity (by which a thinker recognizes having 
the experience of thinking a particular thought), and the sense of agency (by which a thinker 
recognizes – or fails to recognize – that she is actively entertaining that thought). Now our 
initial problem surfaces again : how can a patient's sense of agency be disturbed to the point 
of attributing to someone else her own thoughts and intentions ? 
Two hypotheses seem available. The first is that lack of voluntary control forces the 
experience of alienation. But this assumption seems immediately defeated by evidence: 
people with obsessive compulsive thoughts – who have no voluntary control on their thoughts 
- do not tend to attribute their thoughts to other thinkers. A second hypothesis may be derived 
from Dennett’s view on the self . Let us grant that the self is an entity in a narrative, produced 
as a result of a culturally-educated attempt to organize in intentional terms an agent’s past 
experience and decisions. In that vein, one might claim that a patient denies having one 
particular thought  because it does not fit her conception of herself.  This solution is very 
close to the elaboration on Armstrong's view articulated above. One significant difference is 
that the contrast between subjectivity and agency/passivity is superimposed on Armstrong’s 
contrast between a previously acquired conception of oneself and new congruent/non-
congruent mental happenings. What is called subjective is what fits, what is called objective 
or external is what does not.  Still, why should a patient attribute the non-congruent thought to 
someone else ? The long-waited explanation of alienation that is offered  in the last pages of 
the book seems disconcertingly plain. Here is the main passage : 
“As far as phenomenology itself is concerned, our hypothesis is that the apparent 
intelligence of the thoughts provides the experiential or epistemic basis for attributing 
them to another agent. Mary [a subject having an experience of alienation] experiences 
her thoughts as “personal” (intelligently composed by someone), but not as expressive 
of her own person”. (174). 
 This explanation, the authors say, is close to Hoffman’s by assuming that the experience 
of alienation is epistemically warranted given the evidence available (i.e. as of an intentional 
action foreign to the subject’s own goals); it is also close to Frith’s by offering a unified 
explanation for hearing voices and thought insertion. Finally it is close to Frankfurt’s by  
assuming that people are agents qua thinkers and not only qua physical forces. It further has 
the merit of distinguishing conceptually the case of schizophrenic deluded patients with 
thought insertion, who deny having formed a thought, from obsessive thinkers, who take the 
blame for thinking their compulsive thoughts. It also distinguishes  nicely thought-insertion 
from thought control. In the latter case, a subject feels manipulated in her agency; she retains 
a capacity of forming intentions, but takes her intentions to have been fiddled with;   in the 
former case, in contrast, she takes her agency to have been complety taken over by someone 
else; it is part of her experience that no intention of hers has been formed or  distorted. 
The authors' explicit aim is to offer a conceptually adequate description of the types of 
experience involved in alienation; they emphasize accordingly that the contrast between a 
sense of subjectivity and a sense of agency plays a central role in the phenomenological 
aspects of pathological states. Even in those cases where patients attribute their own  acts to 
some external force, they experience agency-deprivation in a first-person, "subjective",  way. 
This difference in the dimensions of self-awareness can also be found in other 
psychopathological conditions not considered in the present book. Depersonalized patients 
also report  having a subjective feeling of depersonalization, and patients with Cotard 
syndrom  that they do not exist anymore.The fact that a subject could retain a first-person 
experience of episodes that seem associated with an impression of passivity or    of alien 
influence is certainly a major indication in favour of a polarity in conscious awareness 
between simple conscious registering and self-attributing an active/passive role in acting and 
thinking. The conceptual contribution offered however is not intended to provide a causal 
explanation of the various symptoms discussed.  The reader may at this point have an 
impression that the rules have changed, for Hoffman and Frith were criticized for offering no 
causal explanation of the difference between, say, lack of control and sense of alienation, and 
not for  lacking sensivity to the conceptual opposition between the two varieties of symptoms.  
Let us come to the proposal itself, namely that thought insertion is a case of failed agency, 
experienced by the agent at a personal level as an intelligible  thought  to which she cannot 
identify ("not expressive of her own person"). This explanation is valuable as it stands, in 
particular because it explains the patient's perspective on agency in epistemologically clear 
terms (the subject is not irrational, her ways of deriving intentionality and goal-directedness 
are similar to everyone else's.). Two difficulties however seem worth articulating and 
exploring further. The first is linked to the assumed contrast in the quotation above, between 
an "intelligently composed thought" and a "thought expressive of her own person”. In other 
words, the subject is able to recognize a complex thought, which triggers a mechanism of 
interpretation (who is the thinker ?); but she is unable to match what she hears or grasps with 
a thought she produced. One problem for the explanatory value of this contrast (intelligible 
but incongruent) is that the very capacity to appreciate composition in thought seems to be 
quite similarly used in understanding and in  producing a thought.  The fact that some 
structured utterance is heard or mentally grasped "as an intelligible thought" does not bias the 
attribution one way or another. One would rather suppose, on a conceptual basis, that the fact 
is neutral as to who said what. The incongruent content, taken at the phenomenological level, 
can be dealt with in other ways than in projecting the corresponding intention into another 
agent; for example, as an isolated memory popping up, or as a piece of unexplained 
compulsive thought; incongruence does not seem to constrain interpretation towards alien 
intrusion. 
An alternative claim would be that the feeling of agency is not causally closed on 
phenomenology. It is not inconceivable, given the growing neurophysiological  evidence, that 
the subject described is biased by a specific tendency to over-attribute properties to others - an 
impairment that might cumulate its effect  with a general difficulty in appreciating the 
difference between active, voluntary thinking/acting and automatic association of 
thought/movement sequences. Such a difficulty might be generated by a  perturbed 
subpersonal mechanism balancing self-other attributions (through a regulation of cortico-
cortical projections, effected by structures such as the prefrontal area and the right inferior 
parietal lobule). If such a bias exists, then it is hopeless to try and interpret the delusion on the 
basis of some other features apparent in the phenomenology. 
 A second problem lies in a tension between two lines of explanation, with a resulting 
ambiguity concerning the status of our thoughts. One is the view  initiated by Hughlins 
Jackson and Irwin Feinberg, developped by Christopher Frith, and defended more recently by 
John Campbell (1999) :   thinking is a type of action, involving motor activity and monitoring 
of intentions; a mechanism of efference copy such as the one that subserves action awareness 
has to be present both to plan one's trains of thought and to retrospectively attribute them to 
oneself. The other is the view, inspired by Frankfurt, according to which thinking is not 
immediately an active process; it can however be appropriated through the exercise of second-
order thoughts. A subject may thus act or think in a way that does not reflect what she wants 
to do: she may be "irresistibly inclined" to do or think something. Let us note that thinking, in 
that view, is not equated with action; both thinking and acting may be passive or active. 
Frankfurt does not think that a subject normally has control on all his thoughts or intentions to 
act; he takes it that a subject will at best only identify with a subset of these. If and only if he 
is able to form second-order thoughts, desires and intentions, he will be in a position i) to 
chose those of his first-order thoughts, desires and intentions to which he wants to identify; ii) 
to appreciate their coherence  with his second-order preferences. 
What makes the parallel between Feinberg/Frith and Frankfurt uneasy is an irreducible  
difference in levels of explanation ; the first account explores subpersonal mechanisms 
regulating the way in which a subject may become aware of what she does. The second 
analyses the reasons that a person may have to feel free in a deterministic world. The issue is 
to show that there is more to autonomy than just having thoughts or  acting out of desires; it is 
identifying oneself "actively" with them.   It makes no sense, in the latter perspective, to raise 
the question of the experience of autonomous agency in a subject who would not grasp that a 
thought is occurring in her mind, or that she performed a certain action. The subject must at 
least recognize that he involuntarily thought that thought or did that action. Therefore 
Frankfurt's kind of approach does not have any bearing on the deluded patient's case. 
Furthermore, how can the view that a thought  can  only become "active" when a second-
order thought is used to evaluate or guide its first-order target,   be reconciled with a theory in 
which every thinking episode registers as an action via an efference copy ? We have here a 
bootstrapping problem : only when reaching a second level of awareness can a sense of 
autonomous agency be gained. But some kind of conscious active agency must already be in 
place for the higher kind of agency awareness to get started. 
Maybe a central difficulty consists in  assuming with Frith that thinking is in all cases a 
variety of acting. One might rather claim that a thinking episode qualifies as a mental act only 
if it involves a controlled process guiding the thinker to a target mental property, a definition 
that is close to Frankfurt's own view. Most of our ordinary thoughts do not qualify as actions 
in that sense, just as many physical movements are done with no intention in mind. If we thus 
have two distinct concepts of active thought in Frith and in Frankfurt, the latter's account 
cannot "dovetail" on the former's distinction (see p. 152).   
The book under review offers much more than a particular analysis of the experience  of 
alienation; it is a lively and documented  philosophical introduction to difficult questions on 
the pathologies of consciousness and agency. It is certainly one of the first endeavours of this 
kind within analytic philosophy and should help many students and researchers to discover 
the new field of cognitive psychopathology as well as the important philosophical issues that 
arise in it. 
 
Joëlle Proust 
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